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Abstract: The contemporary debate about “who is a journalist” is occurring in 
two distinct domains: law and professional ethics. Although the debate in 
these domains is focused on separate problems, participants treat the central 
question as essentially the same. This article suggests that the debates in law 
and professional ethics have to be resolved independently and that debate 
within those domains needs to be more nuanced. In law, it must vary 
depending on whether the context involves constitutional law, statutory law, 
or the distribution of informal privileges by government officials. In 
professional ethics, the debate should not be oriented around a single 
definitional threshold but should identify tiers that take account of different 
communicators' unique goals, tactics, and values. 
Introduction 
The burgeoning of media technology and the evolution of news 
formats has made the issue of journalistic identity more complicated 
and consequential. Courts have had to define more clearly the people 
entitled to claim legal protections traditionally provided to journalists, 
while mainstream reporters and editors have been challenged to 
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differentiate themselves from the emergent class of bloggers, 
dilettantes, and do-it-yourselfers. At the same time, mainstream 
journalists continue to battle each other for the loyalties of readers 
and viewers who are increasingly sympathetic to charges that the 
established media are feckless, shallow, or biased. 
 
It is difficult to say whether the debate over the question of 
“who is a journalist” has been fruitful. Courts and legislatures have 
adopted disparate definitions, and many journalists seem to be 
growing weary of the discussion. In an online forum hosted by the 
Poynter Institute, for example, one reporter insisted that “we all know 
what a journalist is, and it's silliness to argue about it,” while another 
dismissed the whole matter as “just so much sanctimonious bullshit” 
(Poynter, 2001). We believe the discussion ought to be continued, but 
it will never be productive unless the parties are clear about the aims 
of the inquiry and the contexts in which the answers are relevant. 
The matter of who is a journalist is salient in at least two separate 
domains: law and professional ethics. Within each of these domains 
are multiple contexts in which the question is relevant, each with its 
own purposes and consequences. 
 
This article describes and evaluates the attempts by courts, 
legislators, and other government officials to fashion a definition of 
journalist, to assess their failures and successes, and to explain how 
their efforts are relevant—or not—to the search for a definition in the 
professional ethics domain. It also proposes a set of categories to use 
in distinguishing the work of various communicators in that domain. 
Differentiating the Central Domains 
Some people resolve the question of who is a journalist by 
leaning on clichés or making “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” kinds of 
arguments. Others believe the question should not be addressed at all, 
fearing that any agreement on a definition might be a first step toward 
“licensing of journalists and ultimately to censorship” (Meyer, 2002, p. 
11A). Between those extremes, however, are a number of discrete 
arguments distinguished either by their core assumptions or their 
particular points of emphasis. 
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The central problem is that participants in the debate have 
presented their individual conceptions of journalist as universal, 
without regard to the peculiarities of context. At the broadest level, 
they have failed to specify the domains in which they are operating 
(law versus professional ethics), even though the aims of the inquiry 
are quite different in each. Also, participants have failed to 
acknowledge important distinctions within those domains and the 
inevitability, if not the necessity, of recognizing and applying more 
than a single definition. 
 
Although it is important to draw distinctions between law and 
ethics in exploring the issue of journalistic identity, these two domains 
are overlapping and interdependent. By illuminating fundamental 
human values and moral imperatives, ethics helps give force and 
legitimacy to legal mandates. By demarcating the boundaries of 
citizens' behavior, law accomplishes through coercion what ethics is 
often unable to achieve solely through appeals to conscience. Law and 
ethics are also related in that they are both concerned with the 
advancement of some socially shared vision of the public good. 
Nevertheless, the debates in each of these domains have clearly 
different purposes. 
 
The law domain is shaped by the classical liberal ideas of 
autonomy, reason, and self-determination and is best characterized by 
libertarian press theory and its tangents, which assume that society is 
best served by removing all but the most essential barriers to free 
expression (Rivers, Schramm, & Christians, 1980). Because it is 
presupposed in this domain that “debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide open” ( New York Times v. Sullivan, 
1964, p. 270) and that the public is enriched by its exposure to 
“diverse and antagonistic sources” of information ( Associated Press v. 
U.S., 1945, p. 20), the bias is toward an expansive definition of 
journalist. 
 
In the professional ethics domain, the motive for defining a 
journalist is not to enable free expression but to separate credible 
contributors from less credible ones by establishing benchmarks of 
professional practice and measuring people against them. It is 
exclusive, not inclusive. Here, theories emphasizing social 
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responsibility, shared commitments, and other communitarian ideals 
are dominant (see Rivers et al., 1980; Nerone, 1995; Commission on 
Freedom of the Press, 1947). Unlike in the law domain where there is 
resistance to discrimination among speakers, here it is essential. While 
the legal debate is about people's ability to freely contribute news and 
information in the ideas marketplace, the professional ethics debate is 
about the relative value of those contributions. Those kinds of 
qualitative judgments are enabled by, and help reinforce, narrower 
definitions than those favored in law. 
 
The basic distinctions 
between law and professional 
ethics are rarely made in this 
debate. 
 
 
The basic distinctions between law and professional ethics are 
rarely made in this debate. Legal and ethical arguments are routinely 
juxtaposed in falsely dichotomous ways, which either misdirects or 
halts the dialog. An article in Quill, a publication of the Society of 
Professional Journalists, provided one small example. It quoted Tom 
Rosenstiel of the Committee of Concerned Journalists, who argued that 
journalism is not about affiliations but actions. “You can't say, ‘I’m a 
journalist, here's my press pass,' ” Rosenstiel said. “You have to say, 
‘I’m a journalist. Here's my work.' Some of the people with press 
passes don't make the cut” (Barton, 2002, p. 11). This was contrasted 
with what the writer described as the “broader, more inclusive view” of 
Lucy Dalglish, head of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, who suggested that a journalist is “someone who is collecting 
information with the purpose of disseminating it to the public” (Barton, 
2002, p. 11). 
 
These comments were presented as competing points of view, 
when in fact they were aimed at completely different questions, or at 
least different aspects of the same question. Their attentions might 
have been focused on the same phrase—who is a journalist—but 
Rosenstiel was clearly working in the domain of professional ethics, 
trying to aid our judgments about whom to trust in the world of news, 
while Dalglish was clearly working in the domain of law, trying to 
propose some minimum eligibility standard for access to legal 
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protections. Both opinions are reconcilable and are indeed consistent 
with the prevailing approaches in their respective domains: in law, an 
egalitarian model that emphasizes equal access to rights and 
privileges, and in professional ethics, an expert model that emphasizes 
the unique proficiencies and duties of media professionals. 
 
It is often problematic when the language of one domain is used 
in the other, or when the contributors are unclear about the specific 
issues to which their comments are directed. People proposing narrow 
definitions are labeled as enemies of the First Amendment, and those 
proposing broader definitions are derided for giving anonymous online 
hacks the same treatment as the most esteemed veterans of the 
media mainstream. The hypersensitivity to perceived assaults on the 
First Amendment is particularly destructive because it impedes the 
more meaningful debate about what matters in the world of 
communication and what sources deserve our notice and trust. 
Because traditional journalists have the most to lose in competition 
with their less established rivals, it is in their interest to establish a 
clear professional identity. But they seem almost more apprehensive 
than their counterparts to participate in the debate, perhaps fearing 
that any attempts to define what they do might weaken their own First 
Amendment freedoms, or might harden their rights at the expense of 
someone else's, which is not an outcome most traditional journalists 
would celebrate. 
 
In addition to conflating the two principal domains, the parties 
also overlook subtleties within them. In law, there are at least three 
unique contexts in which the definitional dilemma arises: constitutional 
law, statutory law, and informal privileges granted by government 
officials. Each of these requires separate analysis. The same is true in 
the professional ethics domain where the participants tend to build 
their arguments around the clumsy dichotomy of journalist/non-
journalist when a more tiered approach, with multiple definitions, 
might be both necessary and unavoidable. So, instead of pursuing a 
single set of criteria, we might recognize gradations that acknowledge 
the peculiar contributions and roles of different communicators. In 
doing so, there may be a temptation to look to the law for guidance. 
The definitions in that domain already exist in concrete form—they are 
spelled out in statutes and court opinions. However, not only are many 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2007): pg. 241-261. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
6 
 
of those definitions flawed, but they also are often unsuitable in the 
domain of professional ethics, where the focus is more on best 
practices than minimum standards. 
The Law Domain 
Constitutional Law 
Although the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains 
only 14 words devoted to speech and press, the federal courts have 
outlined with relative clarity the scope of people's freedom to 
disseminate information and ideas. The courts have been less clear 
about whether the First Amendment also protects people's right to 
gather news and whether the Constitution endows journalists with 
protections unavailable to other citizens. The Supreme Court has never 
explicitly recognized any unique protections for journalists, although a 
few of its decisions, perhaps inadvertently, have come close. In 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, for example, the Court held that 
“the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot 
stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant …” 
(emphasis added) ( Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 1986, p. 777). 
This reference was repeated in subsequent cases and was read by 
some as recognition of separate constitutional standards for 
journalists. 
 
At least one former member of the Court, Justice Potter Stewart 
(1975), argued that the press status of a litigant is constitutionally 
relevant and that media litigants should be afforded special rights not 
available to the public generally. Stewart argued that the Press Clause 
of the First Amendment should be read separately from the Speech 
Clause, and that the former should be understood as an explicit 
guarantee of unique protections for the “institution of the press,” 
which he defined as the “the daily newspapers and other established 
news media” (p. 634). Any other interpretation, Stewart said, would 
turn the Press Clause into a “constitutional redundancy” (p. 631). 
Among other things, Stewart lobbied for recognition of a “reporter's 
privilege.” He argued that these kinds of protections are essential to 
facilitating the press' “organized, expert scrutiny of government” (p. 
634). 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2007): pg. 241-261. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
7 
 
Although Stewart was the only member of the Court to publicly 
promote this expert model of the press, much of the Court's rhetoric 
about the press fits comfortably within that framework. The justices 
routinely cast freedom of the press in instrumental terms, suggesting 
that neither the press nor individual journalists are free for their own 
purposes but to enhance “discourse for the sake of a citizenry better 
informed and thus more prudently self-governed” ( Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 1991, Souter dissent, p. 677). In addition, the news media 
have a “constitutionally established role” (Saxbe, Powell concurrence, 
1974, p. 864) of fostering “discussion of governmental affairs” and 
other public issues ( Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super Ct. for Norfolk 
County, 1982, p. 604). Justice White put it more bluntly in Tornillo: 
“The press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry” ( Miami 
Herald v. Tornillo, 1974, White dissent, p. 258). These references are 
in line with the expert model in which the press employs its unique 
credentials to serve as the public's proxy in its supervision of 
government. 
 
Despite these indefinite references, the Court's rulings do not 
support Stewart's framework or the recognition of special rights. In 
fact, the Court plainly rejected his bifurcated construction of the First 
Amendment in its only reporter's privilege case, Branzburg v. Hayes 
(1972). In Branzburg, the Court ruled against several reporters who 
claimed the First Amendment protected their refusal to comply with 
grand jury subpoenas. The reporters argued that the subpoenas 
breached their editorial autonomy and threatened the sanctity of their 
confidential source relationships. The Court disagreed, relying on the 
common law maxim that the public has a right to “every man's 
evidence” (p. 674). One of the Court's principal concerns was that 
recognition of a privilege would force courts to define the class of 
citizens entitled to invoke its protections. This was a “questionable 
procedure,” the Court wrote, “in light of the traditional doctrine that 
liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses 
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large 
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition 
methods” (p. 704). The Court added that the “informative function 
asserted by representatives of the press … is also performed by 
lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and 
dramatists” (p. 705). This echoed language from one of the Court's 
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earliest First Amendment cases in which it held that freedom of the 
press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion” ( Lovell v. Griffin, 1938, p. 452). 
 
Two key models emerge from 
the Supreme Court’s opinions: 
an expert model … and an 
egalitarian model. 
 
 
Two key models emerge from the Supreme Court's opinions: an 
expert model, in which journalists are conceived of as a uniquely 
qualified and clearly identifiable collection of professionals who serve 
as agents of the public in the procurement and dissemination of news, 
and an egalitarian model—illuminated by Branzburg and Lovell—in 
which all citizens are equally equipped and equally free to serve as 
newsgathering watchdogs. Because the Court has refused to recognize 
any special protections for journalists under the First Amendment, 
these definitional distinctions would seem to be of no consequence. 
But in the 35 years since Branzburg, most federal circuit courts have 
recognized a First Amendment reporter's privilege. They have done so 
not by ignoring Branzburg but by limiting it to its peculiar facts and 
differentiating all but the most closely analogous cases. 
 
Although the circuit courts have taken a jaundiced view of the 
Branzburg ruling, they have consistently embraced its egalitarian 
conception of the press. What was viewed as an obstacle by the 
Branzburg court—the potentially boundless criteria for eligibility—has 
been treated by the lower courts as the privilege's saving grace. In 
fashioning more wide-ranging definitions that are not tied to salary, 
education, experience or other credentials, the lower courts have 
effectively solved the “special rights” dilemma by making the privilege 
available to any citizen industrious enough to seek and report news. 
 
The most widely cited test in recent opinions is the one 
articulated by the Second Circuit in Von Bulow v. Von Bulow (1987). It 
requires that the person claiming the privilege show “the intent to use 
the material—sought, gathered, or received—to disseminate 
information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception 
of the newsgathering process” (p. 144). The Ninth Circuit and the D.C. 
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Circuit have explicitly endorsed that test, and the Third Circuit has 
adopted one that is nearly identical, except that it emphasizes 
“investigative reporting” ( In re Madden, 1998, p. 130). Several other 
circuits have addressed the issue less formally, but all have shown a 
clear preference for functional criteria, such as the intent of the 
newsgatherer and the nature of the information, rather than on the 
medium employed or the newsgatherer's expertise or other 
qualifications. The federal courts have consistently employed broad 
criteria and have found investigative book authors ( Shoen v. Shoen, 
1993), filmmakers ( Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 1977), scholars 
( Cusumano v. Microsoft, 1998), and publishers of technical 
newsletters ( Apicela v. McNeil Lab Inc., 1975) to be journalists for 
purposes of the privilege. And although the cases are not abundant, 
there can be little doubt that the federal courts will continue to make 
the privilege available to those disseminating news through newer 
media. 
Assessing the Debate 
Because debate on this track is focused on the dimensions of a 
constitutional right, the courts' embrace of the egalitarian model and 
their adoption of broad eligibility criteria are certainly warranted. The 
protections outlined in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and represent 
the core, constitutive freedoms essential for people's productive, 
democratic participation and their ability to lead autonomous, self-
directed lives. Furthermore, constitutional rights are not merely the 
means by which we advance social goals; they are the bases upon 
which we preserve moral principles—in this case, our individual liberty 
in the pursuit and expression of our perceived truths. To permit access 
to those rights only by those who meet certain artificial criteria would 
be inconsistent with the broader tenor of the Constitution, which 
champions equality and eschews class distinctions. As Philip Bobbitt 
(1982) suggested, this “constitutional ethos”—the “cadence of our 
rights” expressed through the document—should guide our 
interpretation of the Constitution's discrete passages (pp. 176–177). It 
is not insignificant that the other rights enshrined in the Constitution 
are available to all citizens equally and not to particular social subsets. 
That is not to say that a right can be invoked by any person in any 
context. A person still needs to be engaged in the underlying behavior 
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that the right protects—in this case gathering and disseminating 
news—but factors other than behavior, such as characteristics, 
credentials, or affiliations, should be left out of the equation. 
Statutory Law 
With the exception of the reporter's privilege, which is now 
recognized in one form or another in most federal circuits, the courts 
have not interpreted the Constitution as providing any special rights 
for journalists. Congress and the state legislatures, however, have 
passed a number of laws creating some unique protections. Thirty-
three states and the District of Columbia have passed shield laws that 
give journalists explicit protections against certain subpoenas, and as 
of this writing there are two bills before Congress that would establish 
a federal shield law. Thirty-one states have also passed retraction 
statutes that allow media defendants to minimize their liability in 
defamation suits by retracting the allegedly defamatory material. 
Some states' long-arm statutes, which govern courts' jurisdiction over 
various litigants, provide special dispensation for media defendants. 
Also, some freedom of information (FOI) laws waive the search fees 
and photocopying costs when the requester is a journalist. 
 
Most of these laws contain some language defining “journalist” 
or “the press,” but they are much narrower and more focused on 
traditional media than the definitions used by courts in First 
Amendment reporter's privilege cases. Both the statutory language 
and the statements made by courts interpreting those statutes are 
reflective of an expert conception of the press, which is manifest in 
several ways. One is by an emphasis on occupational status. The 
language from the Florida shield law is typical in that it defines a 
journalist as “a person regularly engaged in [newsgathering] for gain 
or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while working as a 
salaried employee …” (emphases added). Similarly, the D.C. shield law 
requires that a person be “employed by the news media;” the Indiana 
law requires a person to be “an editorial or reportorial employee, who 
receives or has received income” for newsgathering; and the Delaware 
law even includes a requirement that a person be employed at least 20 
hours per week before he or she qualifies. Other references to 
employment are less definite, such as the laws in Alaska, Illinois, 
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Louisiana, and North Carolina, which refer to those engaged “in the 
business” of newsgathering. 
 
Most shield laws also limit their application to material 
disseminated in particular media. The North Dakota statute provides a 
more egalitarian example in that it protects journalists working for 
“any organization engaged in publishing or broadcasting news,” but 
most other statutes specifically identify the covered media, which 
presumably excludes those not mentioned. The Nebraska law provides 
a more exhaustive list than most—it protects “any newspaper, 
magazine, other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire 
service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or 
cable television system”—and yet it still leaves out scholars, 
documentarians, bloggers, and many others. Some statutes also add 
vague qualifiers, such as the Indiana law that says individuals must be 
“bona fide” employees of “legitimate” news organizations and the 
Rhode Island law that requires that someone work for an “accredited” 
news organization, whatever that is. The lists of covered media 
included in the two bills before Congress are comprehensive, although 
an earlier version of the Senate bill would not have covered news 
organizations that publish only on the Web. Retraction statues follow 
similar patterns and are even more likely than shield laws to explicitly 
protect only traditional media. The Tennessee statute, for example, is 
one of several that allow a retraction to serve as a partial defense in a 
libel case but only where the defendant is a “newspaper or periodical.” 
The courts have mostly taken a conservative approach to interpreting 
these statutes, and they occasionally color their opinions with expert-
model rhetoric. In Matera v. Superior Court, for example, an Arizona 
court held that the state shield law was “not designed to protect the 
information collected, but rather was designed to aid a specific class—
members of the media—in performing their jobs” (emphasis added) 
( Matera v. Superior Court, 1992, p. 973). Because the courts have 
been unwilling to reach beyond the text to protect people or media not 
specifically mentioned, the kinds of people commonly protected by 
federal courts in the constitutional privilege context are often denied 
statutory protection. These exclusions are not limited to 
unconventional newsgatherers either. Time magazine, for example—a 
quintessentially mainstream publication—was denied protection under 
the Alabama shield law because the statute mentions newspapers but 
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not magazines ( Price v. Time, 2005). The courts have taken a 
similarly strict approach in their interpretation of retraction statutes. 
The Wisconsin courts, for example, have held that because that state's 
statute only mentions print publications, it cannot be invoked by 
broadcasters ( Hucko v. Joseph Schlitz, 1981) or operators of 
electronic bulletin boards (It's in the Cards, 1995). 
 
The courts are not entirely to blame for these results. The basic 
rule of judicial review is that “any conflict between the legislative will 
and the judicial must be resolved in favor of the former” (Dickerson, 
1975, p. 8). So even if the courts believe a statutory definition has 
been too narrowly drawn, they have little discretion to amend it 
through judicial fiat. 
Assessing the Debate 
Although the legal debates over who is a journalist are often 
conducted under the same umbrella, the constitutional debate and the 
statutory debate are distinct, or should be, and are capable of pointing 
to different but equally legitimate conclusions. Constitutions and 
statutes are both valid sources of law, but there are important 
differences that ought to guide our inquiries as well as our scrutiny of 
the judgments already made by courts and legislatures. 
 
(T)he difference between 
constitutional law and 
statutory law is that the former 
guarantees rights while the 
latter confers privileges. 
 
Fundamentally, the difference between constitutional law and 
statutory law is that the former guarantees rights while the latter 
confers privileges. A shield law does not give journalists a right to 
avoid subpoenas; it merely grants them a privilege that can be taken 
away at the whim of a legislative majority. When we say that someone 
has a right to do something or to refrain from doing it, we mean, as 
Dworkin (1978) put it, “that it would be wrong to interfere with his 
doing it” (p. 188). We do not mean wrong in the practical sense of it 
being ill-advised; we mean wrong in the moral sense of it being a 
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violation. This distinction is akin to the one Dworkin made between 
policies and principles. A policy is “that kind of standard that sets out a 
goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, 
social, or political feature of the community,” whereas a principle is “a 
standard that is to be observed … because it is a requirement of 
justice, or fairness or some other dimension of morality” (p. 22). The 
Constitution is the guarantor of rights and is society's ultimate 
expression of principle. Statutes, on the other hand, are merely the 
tools by which we direct our day-to-day lives and are more strictly 
utilitarian. 
 
Many arguments can and should be made in favor of more 
egalitarian statutory definitions. Statutes that require a claimant to be 
engaged in newsgathering as part of their employment or “for gain or 
livelihood” are hard to defend in a world where some of the most 
important news stories are broken by bloggers working without pay or 
institutional affiliations. Statutes that fail to include Internet 
communicators in their lists of covered parties, then, are 
underinclusive and in need of amendment. For that matter, statutes 
that offer blanket coverage for all employees of traditional news 
organizations are overinclusive. Why should a travel writer for a 
newspaper be afforded more protection than, say, a Pulitzer-Prize 
winning author of investigative books on American politics? One 
solution would be to simply redraw the lines in ways that are more 
encompassing. A better approach, however, and one that addresses 
the overinclusiveness problem, is to use the same functional criteria 
that the federal courts have employed in the constitutional context. 
This gives the courts the ability to make more nuanced determinations 
to ensure that those who need protection get it and those who don't 
are not using it to evade an otherwise valid subpoena. 
 
The same approach should be used with other privilege-granting 
laws, such as the retraction statutes, which, even more than the shield 
laws, are focused on conventional media. Legislators should be asked 
to explain why it is socially valuable to encourage newspapers to 
retract their false and defamatory stories but not to provide the same 
incentives for broadcasters, bloggers, or other mass communicators. 
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Informal Privileges 
In addition to the constitutional and statutory rights and 
privileges provided to journalists, government officials often confer 
other benefits that can present legal, ethical, and practical problems. 
The Supreme Court sets aside seats in its courtroom for use by certain 
news organizations. The President invites some members of the press 
to accompany him on Air Force One. Members of Congress often allow 
only credentialed journalists to attend their news conferences. And 
there are a host of other contexts in which public officials at all levels 
of government serve as the arbiters of access. They must establish 
criteria by which to make those determinations, but more as a matter 
of fairness than law. 
 
For the most part, public officials have no obligation to make 
special arrangements for the press. Courts have consistently held that 
there is no First Amendment right of access to places ( Houchins v. 
KQED, 1978)—courtrooms being the only exception ( Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 1980)—and that elected officials have no legal 
obligation to speak to the press ( Baltimore Sun Co. v. Erlich, 2006). 
This discretion, however, is not without limit. The government's 
greater authority to deny access entirely does not include the lesser 
authority to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, for example. Public 
officials are given wide latitude, and they generally open their doors to 
traditional media that reach the widest audiences. 
Assessing the Debate 
By denying access, government officials are certainly limiting 
opportunities for the acquisition of news, but because they have no 
obligation to provide access in the first place the denials do not take 
on a constitutional dimension. This is true even if the government 
provides access to some and not others (except in those situations 
where the decisions are made on the basis of viewpoint or on the basis 
of immutable characteristics such as race or gender). There should be 
no expectation, then, that government officials will favor the wide-
ranging criteria of the egalitarian model in making their access 
determinations. 
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Indeed, even as a simple matter of policy, that kind of 
encompassing definitional standard would probably be unworkable. 
Officials must take into account practical considerations in this context 
that are not present in the constitutional context—namely, the finite 
space available in which to accommodate media representatives. Only 
so many individuals can physically fit into the White House Press Room 
or the House and Senate chambers. A truly egalitarian access policy 
might not be feasible in light of these practical problems and 
administrative burdens. At some point, officials would be forced to ask 
whether implementing such a policy would ultimately misdirect the 
time and efforts of government employees who must attend to the 
public's business. If constitutional rights were involved, the 
government would be expected to absorb more of these burdens, but 
in the context of informal administrative policymaking, officials are 
free to engage in more straightforward cost-benefit analyses. 
 
For many of the reasons just noted, the definitional issue in the 
access context can also be distinguished from that in the statutory 
context. The same kinds of practical and administrative considerations 
are applicable, and government officials are under no legal obligation 
to adopt broad criteria. This would be different if, for example, they 
were being asked to implement a statute that guaranteed access for 
journalists but that did not include a clear definition. In that case, 
there would be a popular mandate in favor of access that would have 
to be respected. But in the typical access/informal privilege situation, 
the courts would likely view these decisions as more akin to 
housekeeping than policymaking. 
 
Legally, then, government officials have little compulsion to 
accommodate the interests of journalists; indeed, they need not 
provide access at all. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to 
expect them to embrace more egalitarian approaches. This might 
seem like a quaint expectation in a world of cold partisanship, but 
public officials still do have a duty to act in ways that put society's 
collective interests ahead of their own. 
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The Professional Ethics Domain 
Unlike in the law domain where courts and legislatures establish 
definitions that are imposed upon others, in the professional ethics 
domain the definitional question ultimately rests with individual media 
consumers. In this domain, no one has the power to mandate 
adherence to a particular definition, nor is it necessary to seek any 
kind of social consensus. Each of us has our own conception, built 
around our peculiar criteria and embedded within the broader 
interpretive frameworks we apply to all information. So, it is perilous 
to orient the debate around a simple journalist/nonjournalist 
dichotomy when there are potentially as many definitions of journalist 
as there are consumers of journalism. Nevertheless, one might make 
some threshold distinctions that seem to represent the logical cut-lines 
in this domain, even though they are unavoidably imperfect. One 
distinction can be made between public communicators—people who 
disseminate newsworthy information to others but in a sporadic and 
unregimented way—and second-level journalists—those who gather 
and disseminate news more deliberately, regularly and conspicuously. 
Another distinction can be made between second-level journalists and 
top-level journalists. Second-level journalists are focused solely on the 
dissemination of truthful, newsworthy information, as are top-level 
journalists. The latter, however, are also committed to gathering and 
telling stories in a particular way, one that honors the higher virtues 
that have traditionally shaped the profession. These distinctions are 
described more fully next, with particular attention paid to whether the 
definitional models from the law domain have any applicability in the 
domain of professional ethics. 
Public Communicators vs. Second-Level Journalists 
One distinction that could be made is between ordinary public 
communicators and what we might call second-level journalists. Public 
communicators are those who contribute something to the world of 
knowledge by disseminating ideas or information to others but who do 
so only occasionally or without a permanent media presence that 
subjects their work to the normal mechanisms of accountability. A 
college professor giving a public address, a witness to a terrorist 
attack who posts a video on You Tube, or an aspiring film critic who 
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sends reviews to others through a listserv would all fall into this 
category, as would professionals in advertising, public relations, or 
other fields whose communications are not designed to report on 
important events occurring in society. 
 
Second-level journalists ... are 
engaged in … regular, 
systematic, and conspicuous 
dissemination of news 
 
Second-level journalists, on the other hand, are engaged in a 
more regular, systematic, and conspicuous dissemination of news. 
Unlike other public communicators, their efforts are continuous and 
their contributions are made with some predictability and purpose; 
they are not simply incidental to some other goal. Second-level 
journalists' raison d'être is the communication of what they in good 
faith believe is truthful information. However, unlike top-level 
journalists, they do not adhere to the standards of practice and core 
values that have traditionally defined the profession and that are 
promulgated in industry codes (e.g., the Society of Professional 
Journalists Code of Ethics) and organizational handbooks (e.g., the 
New York Times' “Ethical Journalism Handbook”). 
 
Because the current debate over journalistic identity was 
triggered by the emergence of bloggers and other Web 
communicators, the participants in the professional ethics domain tend 
to structure their arguments in ways that separate new media and old 
media. Their definitions focus on differences in technology and medium 
instead of content, function, and method. This is certainly true with 
respect to bloggers who are regularly represented as functionally 
indistinguishable from one another, as in this sweeping denunciation 
by the Wall Street Journal's Joseph Rago: “Every conceivable belief is 
on the scene, but the collective prose, by and large, is homogenous: a 
tone of careless informality prevails; posts oscillate between the 
uselessly brief and the uselessly logorrheic” and “complexity and 
complication are eschewed” (2006, p. A18). 
 
This broad-brushing is also common in polls. A survey by the 
Pew Internet & American Life Project, for example, found that 65 
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percent of bloggers do not see their work “as a form of journalism” 
(Lenhart & Fox, 2006, July 19). A University of Connecticut (2006) poll 
found that traditional journalists have a “low regard” for “news” 
presented in blogs, and that only 11 percent of journalists rate news 
on blogs as “excellent” or “good.” According to a BBC poll, only 25 
percent of the public says it has “a lot” or “some” trust in blogs 
(BBC/Reuters/Media Center, 2006). These surveys might be helpful for 
some purposes, but they do little to advance the definitional debate. 
As of early 2007, 12 million Americans operated blogs (Kirsner, 2007, 
February 4), so asking people how they feel about them is like asking 
people how they feel about “broadcasters” without distinguishing 
between Rush Limbaugh, Matt Lauer, and Christiane Amanpour. 
 
It is no doubt tempting to use technology as a short-cut means 
of characterizing and differentiating communicators. Many state 
legislatures have used the same approach in fashioning the press-
protective statutes described earlier. But journalism has never been 
understood as residing in a particular medium, so for any definitions 
and categories to be useful, they must move beyond these structural 
features to consider the ways in which the medium is being used. 
Those who might be described as second-level journalists, therefore, 
come from across the media spectrum and could include bloggers like 
Ariana Huffington (Huffington Post) and Markos Moulitis (Daily Kos), 
websites like Newsmax, print publications like The Progressive and The 
American Prospect, and even television programs like Countdown with 
Keith Olberman or The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. Each of these is a 
source of news, even though it is occasionally coupled with opinion or 
embedded within a larger work of satire. Each is produced regularly 
and displayed prominently. Each presents itself as a news source (less 
so with The Daily Show) and deliberately enters itself into a journalistic 
culture in which its work is critiqued and rebutted. And each is focused 
on the dissemination of what its contributors believe to be the truth, 
even though they are not reliably attuned to the touchstones of top-
level journalism, for example, objectivity, balance, completeness, and 
proportionality. 
 
Many second-level journalists explicitly disavow the label of 
journalist, either because they conceive of themselves differently or 
because they do not want to be subjected to the more exacting 
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standards of the top level. Others embrace the term, however, either 
to secure rights or privileges or to position themselves as trustworthy 
arbiters. What many of them seek is simply the recognition that their 
work has value and that it is to be believed, something that, to some 
anyway, is connoted by the word “journalist.” 
 
Much of the commentary from second-level journalists has a 
triumphant, egalitarian ring to it, and there are some clear parallels 
between the rhetoric in the professional ethics domain and the 
egalitarian standards that often prevail in law. They both reject the 
idea that the truth can only be told by properly trained and educated 
specialists. They reject the idea that the freedom to gather news is a 
superfluity for anyone working outside the media mainstream. Their 
conception of journalism is one that emphasizes its function and 
content and not its structure or institutional imprimatur. They might 
not suggest that everyone is a journalist, but they certainly believe 
anyone can be, and no law or bureaucracy or professional association 
ought to be able to thwart or delegitimize those efforts. Despite these 
similarities, the minimum-standards criteria of the legal domain's 
egalitarian model are actually more permissive than those of second-
level journalism. In some jurisdictions, for example, a university 
professor or a documentary filmmaker might meet the requirements 
for invoking the journalist's privilege but would not be engaged in the 
kind of continuous collection, synthesis, and dissemination that define 
second-level journalism. So, even though the egalitarian model from 
the law domain might be useful in locating the distinctions among 
communicators in the ethics domain, they are not perfectly 
interchangeable. 
 
The expert model is even less applicable here. One could argue 
that even second-level journalists use expert rhetoric in separating 
themselves from ordinary public communicators. That might be true in 
some instances, but it is certainly not as common among second-level 
journalists as it is among top-level journalists. The former, even in 
distinguishing themselves from public communicators, are less likely to 
emphasize their unique expertise or credentials than they are simply 
to identity the ways in which what they do is different. 
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Second-Level vs. Top-Level Journalists 
The second and perhaps more important distinction that might 
be made in the domain of professional ethics is between second-level 
journalists, who are principally focused on truthfully communicating 
news to others, and top-level journalists, who are not merely 
concerned with telling the truth but also with honoring the ethical 
canons of traditional American journalism, such as independence, 
proportionality, comprehensiveness, and accountability. 
 
There are many bases upon which traditional (top-level) 
journalists have sought to set themselves apart—training, education, 
affiliation—but their actions are ultimately what define their work, not 
these peripheral credentials. The debate in this domain is too often 
sidetracked by these expert-model characteristics when what really 
matters—indeed the only things that matter—are the standards of 
practice that journalists follow in their pursuit and dissemination of 
news. 
Training. Some top-level journalists will point to their education, 
either on-the-job or in journalism schools, as a way of separating 
themselves from other public communicators. To them, education, like 
affiliation (discussed below), is often seen as a foundation for ethical 
standards of practice. It is in these formal settings (newsrooms or 
classrooms) that ethical values are introduced and reinforced. The 
value of education in making this distinction is seen among those 
studying journalism as well as those practicing it. For example, one 
student at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism said a 
journalist was a “trained writer” who “perceives an event and reports it 
accurately” (Konner, 1996, p. 4). 
 
Top-level journalists are more than just chroniclers of events. 
They see journalism as a “call to search for the truth” (Konner, 1996, 
p. 4). As former Washington Post editor Howard Simons noted:  
 
People who come into the newspaper business are somewhat 
hyperactive, somewhat creative and somewhat causists. I don't 
mean that in the contemporary sense of the word. I mean they 
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have some sense, rooted in their stomach, of injustice which the 
newspaper gives them an instrument to correct. (Cannon, 1997, 
p. 13) 
 
Those fighting to right wrongs 
are now as likely to be found 
in the blogosphere as they are 
in the A sections of local 
newspapers. 
 
Interestingly, this describes individuals whom many top-level 
journalists would likely exclude from their category. Those fighting to 
right wrongs are now as likely to be found in the blogosphere as they 
are in the A sections of local newspapers. 
Affiliation. Some of those engaged in the debate in the professional 
ethics domain have suggested that a true journalist must be 
associated with an organization (usually brick and mortar) whose 
primary work is the business of producing news. Applying this 
restriction, Washington Post editors and CNN reporters would be 
journalists, but most bloggers, and even those working for online news 
organizations such as Slate.com or The Hotline, might not. In addition, 
commentators like Bill O'Reilly and Maureen Dowd would be 
considered journalists, even though they are not necessarily 
committed to the traditional standards of practice. 
Standards of Practice. Top-level journalists find moral duty in their 
occupations and take seriously the idea that journalism is a public 
trust. These commitments are often expressed through their codes of 
ethics (although there are certainly some top-level journalists who 
honor these principles without writing them down or professing them 
publicly). The codes, which can be traced to the beginning of printing 
in the United States and which were concretized in the early 20th 
century by organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors and the Society of Professional Journalists, provide a set of 
professional benchmarks that reflect a kind of fiduciary spirit. The 
codes articulate the underlying values of the profession and detail 
behaviors the public has come to expect: neutrality, independence, 
accountability, and comprehensiveness. They also suggest that 
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journalists minimize harm in pursuing the news, that they stay 
cognizant of the public interest, and that they serve as reliable 
watchdogs of powerful people and institutions. Some individual 
journalists or organizations go even further, of course, and suggest 
that journalism is also about giving voice to the voiceless or healing 
society's wounds. 
Still others focus less on these behavioral guidelines and more 
on the traits exhibited by individual journalists. Ugland and Slattery 
(2006) argued that top-level journalists (what they called “true 
professionals”) are those who follow particular habits of reliable 
reporting and whose “judgment, character and introspection” gives 
their work special weight (par. 6). Journalists exercise good judgment 
“by recognizing ethical problems when they arise” (par. 7), they 
demonstrate character when they empathize with others and make 
selfless decisions, and they act introspectively when they regularly 
reflect on the long-term impact of their work. 
 
What all of these examples have in common is that they reject 
affiliation, training, and education as legitimate bases upon which to 
differentiate journalists and instead emphasize the broader social 
impact of journalism and the responsibilities of journalists to act as 
stewards of the public interest. That requires a great deal more than 
merely telling the truth. 
Distinguishing the Legal Definitions 
Because the egalitarian model in the law domain provides all 
communicators equal protections, it is of no use when deciding who is 
a top-level journalist. Those debates should instead be focused on the 
elucidation of criteria by which we can assess the value of people's 
contributions to the marketplace of ideas. They are pointedly about 
separating the good from the mediocre and the mediocre from the 
bad, about making plain declarations about the social value of content 
and of content providers. The constitutional law debate, by contrast, is 
not about the value of particular communications but about the “equal 
concern and respect” (Dworkin, p. 180) we must show for the 
communicators. The egalitarian model is also not helpful here because 
it does not help us, as consumers of news, differentiate news providers 
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based on the content of their work. The egalitarian model is more 
focused on structural characteristics and the most basic behavioral 
characteristics but is not a useful framework for evaluating content. 
 
The expert model, created by statutory distinctions, may seem 
at first glance to be a better fit. Here, categories of individuals 
affiliated with institutions, or set apart by education, or by time spent 
on the job, or with work published in a specific medium are declared 
“journalists” under the law. The problem, of course, is that these 
distinctions are arbitrary (especially in a digital world) and focus on 
who someone is rather than on what he or she does. These statutes 
have nothing to do with weighing the relative merit of each writer but 
instead single out those who work in traditional newsrooms for legal 
protection while abandoning all other communicators. 
Conclusion 
As power shifts away from a handful of traditional news 
organizations toward a diverse collection of individuals and institutions, 
the matter of who defines the parameters of journalistic behavior must 
also shift. While once the sole domain of news associations such as 
ASNE and RTNDA, the ethical guidelines of news in the 21st century 
will increasingly be formulated by creators and audience members 
unaffiliated with formal institutions. Ultimately, in the professional 
ethics domain, the question of who is a journalist is in the eye of the 
beholder. Consumers decide for themselves who is a journalist, who is 
to be believed and whom to offer their attention and esteem. 
 
In the law domain, fundamental rights are at stake, so the 
consequences of defining protections for newsgathering and 
expression too narrowly (especially when the party drawing the line is 
the government) are substantially greater than in the professional 
ethics domain where the debate is more about virtue than freedom. In 
the legal domain, there is an element of coercion—the exercise of 
government power to restrain behavior. That is not true in the 
professional ethics domain. There, it is about a private dispute among 
communicators regarding whose work is more valuable. 
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“Who is a journalist?” is often treated as a single question, 
capable of a single answer. But, those four words are really just a 
vessel for a group of distinct definitional questions. The problem is not 
merely that the participants are approaching the issue from different 
perspectives and through their own particular prisms, but that they 
have convinced themselves that this is really about a single question 
rather than several. There are, in fact, two central domains in which 
the definitional question is being contested and several discrete 
contexts within those domains. By conflating these, we short-circuit a 
vital debate in professional ethics and push the debate in law toward 
excessively narrow standards of eligibility. 
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